A Conception of Justice

by Robert J. Romano

Originally published October 24th, 2003

Updated on August 9th, 2004

Updated on August 14^th, 2007

Speculation and practice are two separate and yet integral parts of justice.  Justice should be considered both an idea and a practice, and there needs to be a practical means in order achieve to morally just ends, and also there should be morally just means to achieving prudential ends.  One must do what is best for the self and the common good in order for that choice to be considered just.  There are moral means, and there are moral ends, just as there are prudent means, and prudent ends.  Achieving logical, conscientious, and wise criteria for a means/ends ratio is an essential goal in assessing a conception of justice which has practical applications.  Justice relies on truth, morality, and prudence in assessing one's self-interests and the common good.  Since truth rules over justice, and is necessary for there to be justice, justice requires that the truth be told in assessing that which is morally just and wise.  Justice should assess both what is right, and what is practical; that which is moral, and that which is prudent, respectively.  A balance inherently must be struck between morality and prudence.  Can justice be both moral and prudent? This essay shall look at a conception of justice as both a moral prudence, and a prudent morality.

        Prudence and morality are competitive claims in determining justice, and as such it is both necessary and proper for a conception of justice to be based on a balance between self-interests and the common good.  Since there can be both moral ends and moral means, self-interested ends and practical means, certain types of just choices must be limited to one of two assessments: 1) whether the application of moral ends is practicable in the real world, and thus would not harm any of the contracting parties' interests, or 2) whether the prudent ends are morally right in their conduct, and thus would service the common good.  

        First, however, one must achieve an understanding of each of these two claims when taken on their own, and thus come to see why it is they are competitive.  Prudence deals with practical wisdom, morality deals with one's own conscience, and both are particular types of choices, or judgments.  Each, if taken singularly, is considered to be universal in application.  

        Prudence, the practical choice between possibilities in a circumstantial manner, discriminates between competing interests and favors self-interests and the most practical means to applying them.  In the case of the nation-state, prudence translates into a realist proposition of national interests.  And in the case of the international community, prudence prescribes international strategic stability based upon a balance of power.  In determining the self-interests of a person, a state, or the whole world, the means must be productive and useful towards achieving the ends so as to warrant action.  The means (fighting a war, for instance) may be so counterproductive as to warrant caution in many cases.  However, sometimes the costs of inaction outweigh the costs of action, in which case action in the pursuit of self-interests must be taken.  In other words, in a situation of considerable risk, action must be taken to serve the self-interest of survival.  The practical implications of all possibilities must be examined if one is to be wise, including the costs of using force, or doing nothing, to serve one's interests.  The ends to be achieved by potential choices determine whether or not such a choice would be desirable, and wisdom guides desirable choices to be pursued in a practical manner.  If a choice is desirable and practical, then through the possibilities examined we determine which set of circumstances is more favorable an outcome in relation to self-interests, national interests, and/or international strategic stability.  As a result, these choices are made in relation to both the present and the future.  The benefit of action - fighting a war in the present to remove a danger to international peace and security, for instance - is when the future set of circumstances is more favorable through the use of force than through inaction.  This would necessarily be the prudent, or economical use of force, but such a decision is necessarily outweighed by considerations of more probable potentialities for constructive diplomacy to continue with regard to the dispute at hand between the adversaries.  With each potential future choice, the ends tend to outweigh the means prudentially because of the practical choice between possibilities using the kaleidoscope of time.  Thus, choices made by the self and/or the state are dynamic, and need not be made on a moral basis.  As such, prudent decisions may later be revised or changed due to changing circumstances, as when the possibilities emerge for new, more favorable avenues to potentially be taken.  

        Such appeals are deliberative, or future-oriented, and deal with matters of expedience, but as we shall see they can be made to also be forensic by example and through artistic proof.  That is to say that prudence may be morally justified.  In other words, even though prudence can be taken singularly, it still has a degree of compatibility with morality.

        Morality, in a different formula, assumes that only right, or morally justified choices should be considered, and finally made, under all circumstances, and regardless of other possibilities or choices available.  Choices are made in accordance with absolute principles of judgment and universal codes of behavior, and are based upon firm conviction rather than actual evidence.  Such appeals are artistic, or are argued through invention and the creative powers of the speaker.  They are also forensic, or past-oriented, because they will often appeal to traditional standards and conventions.  Since universal principles apply absolutely, the means tend to outweigh the ends (in a pacifist-driven argument, for instance), and the way in which something is done should be considered.  In this sense, the immediate results or impact of choices are considered, such as in wars in which choices about the types of force to be used must be made to either minimize or maximize the loss of civilian, innocent lives.  Choices made to minimize the loss of innocent life are indeed moral.  Though, if applied completely, wars would be banned (See: Kellog-Briand Pact).  And if applied absolutely, there is no overriding consideration given to the particular circumstances, or future possibilities outside the realm of morality.  Thus, overly moral arguments can be one-sided, and only assume ideal considerations rather than actual possibilities (which are discarded in favor of the more utopian choice).  

        Such appeals may also appeal to morally right ends, as in just war theory.  In some cases, war is the practical means to achieving just ends, when all other hope of diplomatic negotiations have failed, and the two enemies must focus instead on both survival and victory, defense and offense.  Each side will make certain moral claims, and hopefully, the side whose claims are more morally right than other side's will win.  

        A solely moral argument based on universal norms and one's conscience cannot become just in application without an assessment of practicality.  Principles only become normative if they draw agreement in a contractual situation, and a moral decision will only be made if it has practical applications.  Choices may also be made based solely on moral judgment, which would distinguish between possible choices to be made and the ideal choice in all situations, favoring the latter.  

        A solely prudential argument based on practical wisdom cannot be considered just without an assessment of moral rightness.  Choices may be made based solely on prudential judgment (as Aristotle recommends rulers do) in international relations, for instance, as it relates to conduct that is good for one's own national interests, is good for the state, and cares for that state's sovereignty.

        These two types of choices are not mutually exclusive.  Prudence is arguable and is a type of speculative claim which embraces conduct to do with particular circumstances, though can be universally applicable in that one may always simply service one's own interests.  Morality can be optional, and is therefore a prudential possibility to be considered when making choices so long as it is practically applicable.  Thus, the means can be moral and serve a prudent end, and the means can be practical and serve a moral end.  This sort of paradox, where morality and prudence seemingly contradict one another, and yet are integrally related, is the result of the difference between moral goodness and goodness of skilled judgment in action.  

        "The ends do not justify the means" is as much a moral cliché as "The ends justify the means" is a moral outrage.  The former has the logical implication, in one respect, that the means should only be right in their conduct, and the latter asserts that as long as the ends are favorable, that then any means may be employed.  However, neither position is absolutely tenable, because neither can be considered to be universally truthful.  Each is a circumstantial judgment and assessment made about a particular circumstance which can only tell what the final outcome of justice happened to be in those particular circumstances, and hardly provides any means of making an active assessment of the nature of justice.  The first is not practical, and the second is not moral.  The shortcomings of each are realized if and when they are logically applied as normative principles.  Taken universally, "The ends do not justify the means" never allows any actions to ever be taken under any circumstances, since no means can be justified under any circumstances.  In "The ends justify the means," any actions may be taken to service any end, regardless of whether the ends are right, let alone the means.  As universals, the first cannot be implemented since practical applications are not allowed, and the second should not be implemented because there are not any demonstrative principles of morality.  In other words, there is no prudence utilized in the former, and no moral application in the latter.  Since neither should be considered a principle of justice, they must be discarded in favor of a just means/ends formula which necessarily assesses morality and prudence as each applies to the means and the ends.  There must be a practical means to attaining moral ends, and a moral means to attaining prudential ends.  

        These two need to be questions answered: 1) Do moral ends require practical means? And, 2) do moral means justify practical ends? Each asks a question which concerns what is good for the self, and what is good for the common good (inspired by John Nash’s portrayal in A Beautiful Mind).  If both may be answered in the positive, then the ends may be justified by the means, and the means justified by the ends, whether the ends are morally right and serve the common good, or if they simply service one's own self-interests.  An end which serves self-interests can only be justified by actions which are moral in their practice.  And an end which is moral and right requires practical applications in order for it to be achieved.  Thus, no self-interested ends may be pursued which are immoral in their conduct, and no moral means can be pursued which are impossible to even conduct.  Prudent ends demand moral means, and moral ends require prudent means.  Justice is necessary in determining the proper balance between self-interests and common interests.

        Good reasons must be considered in assessing these sorts of normative principles, and they must be basic in order for them to be recognizable and persuasive.  The community must consent to a principle of justice in order for it to become a norm.  (See: Rawls’ Theory of Justice)  An ideal community would never accept the sole pursuit of prudence in means and in ends to be morally justified.  And nor would a wise community accept the sole pursuit of morality in means and in ends to be prudentially justified.  After all, one should do what is good for the self and the commonwealth.  Society may not lawfully harm the individual, and the individual may not lawfully harm society.  

        The sole pursuit of one's own self-interests may be thought to lead to personal happiness, but this particular pursuit carries with it no moral considerations.  Selfishness is most certainly not a virtue.  The pursuit of self-interested happiness should never violate any of the contracting parties' rights to life and equal Liberty if that pursuit is to be considered just.  Equal liberty protected on an individual basis protects and thus must take priority over the pursuit of happiness.  Contracts are necessary between consenting parties, either made verbally or in writing.  The truth must be told in making any sort of contractual arrangement.  In such a manner, our rights are assessed and protected, and the practice of happiness does not interfere with the consenting parties' exercise of equal rights.   The pursuit of one's interests, when such considerations are made, does not interfere with the other parties' claims to right.  If those rights are violated, then justice is required.

        Thus, there may be a good way to get something done, such as traveling the shortest distance between points.  Or there may be a morally good way to get something done which will not have any bad or unfavorable effects upon others, such as staying on the road so you do not trespass on another's private property.  And yet, choices made of prudence can be made morally right, such as in gaining the permission to travel over that property.  This particular analogy can be demonstrated to prove that prudent decisions should be tailored to be morally right in their pursuit, and in their functional aspect, in order to be considered just.  Likewise, moral decisions are required to be tailored to be prudently carried forth, in order to be considered in one's own interests, national interests, or in maintaining international strategic stability via a balance of power.  

        Aside: Can a decision serve both moral and prudent ends? If so, how should it be carried out in order for it to be considered just: prudently, morally, or both? [Update (8/10/04): Upon further examination, I have assessed a number of circumstances in which choices may serve both moral and prudent ends.  Deliberations would have to be had about the practicality of actions taken being both wise and morally right in their conduct.  If choices may be made which serve right and prudent ends, then it should also be possible for conduct to both be right and prudent.  However, if such actions be in a war, what morally right actions are taken on the battlefield as it pertains to enemy combatants? The goal could be to have maximum effectiveness against the enemy, and minimal loss to civilian life, which are both positive and negative goals.  The positive goal is geared towards the ends, and the negative goal is geared towards morality.  What about a situation of regime change, as often happens in wars? If a dictator is brutal, and is to be removed, this positive goal should be tempered with a moral requirement that the people shall be liberated and determine their own way for self-rule.]

        In any event, it is sufficient to state that prudence is not morally unjust in every case, and that in order for a prudent end to be morally justified, decisions of prudence should be tailored to be morally just and right in their actions.  When choices of prudence are made by states, they are morally permissible by their conduct as it relates to morality.  The ends are justified by the means.  Such an interlocking of prudence with morality should best be described as an agreement between the means and the ends, and is a just way to determine the proper balance between self-interests and the common good as a sovereign ruler or in a republic.  Prudent choices should only be made towards particular ends when they can be morally justified by how they are conducted, and moral choices can only be made towards universal ends when they can be prudentially justified by how they are conducted.  

        These limitations on actions of prudence and morality ought to be a universal norm, but that only works with agreement.  Natural laws are best protected by customs and traditions.  In order to draw the sort of agreement for a natural law to become universally recognized, it must be both wise and conscientious, easily recognizable and persuasive.  The principles of justice are often articulated in the form of natural laws and are determined to assess natural rights, and among these are Life, Equal Liberty, and Property and the Pursuit of Happiness.  

        Justice is dependent upon both claims of rightness, and actions which implement those claims, and upon claims of interests, and moral means to implement those ends.  It is both an idea and a practice which may be observed.  It requires both practical wisdom and a conscience.  Both considerations are inherently dependent upon the ability to assess the truth, and as such truth is ultimately the first priority in assessing justice.  A principle of justice must be true in order for it to be both logical and valid.  [Conclusion (8/10/04): In assessing a more perfect conception of justice, a third option should be considered besides 1) moral ends/wise means and 2) prudent ends/morally right means.  The third criteria is 3) moral and wise ends/moral and practical means.  This third conception could be taken as a principle, that no ends may be pursued which are not both morally right and prudent, and that those ends which meet this condition should only be carried out if they are morally right (do not harm other's rights) and practical (do not harm one's own interests).  However, not all ends pursued will always contain both a moral and prudent component.  In many cases, this will not be possible.  As a result, all three conceptions should be considered just options, and can be first assessed by determining if a goal serves self-interests solely, the common good solely, or if it happens to serve both.  If a goal simply serves self-interests, it is a prudent end, and its conduct should be tempered to also serve the common good.  If the goal solely serves the common good, it is a moral end, and should be tempered to also serve self-interests.  And if the goal is both wise and conscientious, it should be both moral in its conduct and guided by skilled practical judgment in action.]