The Federal Republican

Iraq Syndrome

by Robert J. Romano

On the heels of the much-anticipated findings of the Iraq Study Group, and amid calls from members of Congress to increase troop levels by several thousand inside of Baghdad, the President has been considering a new approach to secure Iraq. Though it is clear that the overall goal remains the same, quoted from President Bush’s December 20^th press conference: “a free and democratic Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself, and is an ally in this war on terror...”, what is less clear is if members of Congress themselves are equally committed to America’s involvement in that mission, and whether the nation as a whole has the will to sustain this protracted military struggle in the greater war against terrorists and their state sponsors. Despite the sincere calls for a troop surge, it appears highly unlikely that this escalation will immediately bring about an overall cessation to enemy activity, which to hear some quarters of the criticism, appears to be the only thing that might satisfy all of the critics. So far, the military has responded that if new troops are to be added to the forces already in theatre, there must be a clear mission. The President has held off on the presentation of his new approach, though it is furthermore unclear of how the overall strategy will change. Without clarity on these fundamental issues, it is hard to judge whether the U.S. is about to signal a decline in its war effort or a significant escalation.

Instead of attempting to decipher what the President might do, though it is safe to say that he remains committed to securing victory, this piece shall focus on the prospects of our failure in Iraq, and in extension, the war on terror, and whether the U.S. indeed does have the will and resolve to see through the significant efforts already underway, and finally what we must do to achieve our objectives.

One immediate danger that our failure shall ensure is an “Iraq Syndrome” (quite similar to its Vietnamese strain): an unwillingness of U.S. leadership and the American people to participate in a protracted military struggle abroad, even a necessary one. It may not be necessary for the enemy to win on the battlefield against our forces in order to win in Iraq, for a precipitous withdrawal would signal retreat in the greater war against the Islamists. Like it or not, Iraq is the central theatre in the war which we fight, and to the extent that we have made it a proving ground for the prospects of freedom and democracy in the Middle East, we must prevail. The costs of continued commitment to Iraq should be weighed in contrast to losing Iraq to the enemy which we face.

Withdrawal, or redeployment without victory, will devastate U.S. efforts to fight abroad against other state sponsors of terrorism, gathering dangers that too seek access to the world’s deadliest weapons, and whom have also been most unhelpful to the effort inside Iraq itself. It will signal to these enemies that the U.S. is unwilling to deal militarily with other threats to peace and security in the region and beyond, and hamper international efforts to deal effectively to remove those dangers.

The importance of dealing with Syria and Iran was not entirely lost on the Iraq Study Group, who recommended direct negotiations with Iraq’s neighbors to achieve resolution to the overall conflicts which have embroiled the Middle East for decades. Now, why was that, if not for the reason that events in Iraq are somehow related to the machinations of Baathist Syria and Islamist Iran? The ISG’s comprehensive proposal suggests that without international support for reconciliation in Iraq, especially from Iraq’s destabilizing neighbors, resolution to the conflict within Iraq will remain nebulous. However, much of the U.S. diplomatic approach and energies toward Syria and Iran deal directly with the issues of Lebanon and uranium enrichment, respectively. In addition, because of poor relations on these issues, Syria and Iran really have no incentive to become helpful towards the mission in Iraq, short of ceding Lebanon to Hezbollah and allowing Tehran to develop its nuclear technology without the regulation of the IAEA, the Security Council, or the NPT. Indeed, with the unanimous passage of Security Council resolution after resolution against both Syria and Iran on the issues outlined, is adding Iraq to the list of issues that cannot be solved diplomatically really the right prescription?

Without Baghdad, its capital city, as Charles Krauthammer suggests, it will be impossible to state that Iraq has been secured, and the burgeoning Iraqi Security Forces, in concert with coalition allies, must continue its operations for the sake of achieving Iraq’s goals of a peaceful democracy. This author certainly agrees that if there were to be a significant increase in force in Iraq, it should be in Baghdad, but I also worry about the mixed signals that we often send as it relates to our involvement in Iraq. For instance, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid recently stated he would support a temporary troop surge for a few months. But, what if an increased troop presence in Baghdad, indeed, in Iraq, is necessary for longer than that?

Attached to UN Security Council Resolution 1723, which extends the mandate of the U.S.-led action in Iraq, is a written request from Prime Minister Maliki that the MNF remain for at least another year. In all of the debate we have witnessed, has there been all that much focus on what Iraq requires of the international community? As participants in the liberation of Iraq, we are duty-bound to see our mission through completion, not to leave Iraq when the going gets tough, or to believe that temporary tinkering of troop levels will have the lasting impact we all desire. The truth is, the reality of how long our troops will need to remain in Iraq will be dictated by the circumstances on the ground, not by the debate in Washington. It will be determined by how long Iraq requires the presence of the MNF to maintain peace and stability inside of Iraq, and therefore by our relationship with Iraq. The ISG seems to indicate that we ought to condition our role in Iraq upon the achievement by the Iraqis of political and security milestones, which seems to run parallel to Time magazine’s recent article, “How to Avoid Iraq Syndrome,” which outlines two alternative scenarios: one where the U.S. is blamed for destabilizing Iraq, or another where Iraq is. Basically, the thinly veiled conventional wisdom is this: if all else fails, blame it on the Iraqis. This in turn will allow America to save face on the world stage, leave Iraq with dignity, and not hamper future efforts to take action abroad, and specifically to deal effectively with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This is simply writing the script for a return to the pre-9/11 doctrines of diplomatic engagement as the solution to international terrorism. Apparently, only if the centuries-old conflict of Jerusalem is settled, peace will not be had. While that may ultimately be true, it must also be true that securing Baghdad and Iraq proper for the millions who chose a constitutional republic is necessary to stand up an alternative vision of security and prosperity in the Middle East. It must also be true that in fact it is contingent upon the Palestinians to take the fight to the Hamas and other terrorist groups, for Lebanon to take the fight to Hezbollah, and for the Iraqis to take the fight to the Mahdi militia, for instance. Diplomatic grandstanding, and holding peace conferences, may make everyone feel better, but it will not effectively uproot the terrorist organizations which often operate with impunity. The practical necessity is that the enemy must be denied its harbors.

Securing Iraq sooner rather than later has become as much a political necessity as a military ideal in American debate, which seemingly is demanding instant results in a struggle where none may be in the offering. Though there are undoubtedly many things that may be done to improve security in Iraq, and the coalition in concert with our Iraqi partners are developing the framework for that so that the MNF will eventually not be necessary in the future, nobody has offered any reason to believe that the results we desire can be achieved in a few short months, let alone within the timeframe of President Bush’s second term. Addressing public discontent over the war effort becomes much trickier to verbalize than merely the reordering of U.S. military strategy inside Iraq, because we must be clear that we are not simply trying to popularize a war effort which may be more difficult than the American people may like. Strategy should not be changed because the dimension of time does not comply with impatient politicians’ and pundits’ wishes for perfection.

We must be clear if we are escalating our efforts. But we must not put a time frame on it. Do not say “temporary.” Timelines for escalation make goals as impossible to achieve as timelines for withdrawal. Such proclamations from the Majority Leader of the Senate do not speak of the realities on the ground as they will unfold. How does Senator Reid know it would only take a few months? Granted, he has since withdrawn any support for a troop surge, but nonetheless, such comments should be indicative of the mentality that pervades the Congressional majority during this period.

Better question: what’s the rush? Feeding discontent and impatience within the American electorate may make for good politics, but could lead to disastrous consequences upon the world stage. Let us all hope that the Democrat electioneering does not become military strategy, because their advocacy of the projection of American power is clearly tied to popular opinion. Are we to only fight wars that are easy and can be achieved in short periods of time? What sort of message is this for an important leader of Congress to send when we face adversaries in a years-long military struggle not unlike the Cold War, against an entrenched, highly ideological enemy bent upon dominating the politics of the Middle East? On the one hand, the Democrat party is advocating for a quick war, but on the other hand, we are in a long war. We need not worry if “Iraq Syndrome” might catch, it clearly already has, and Time’s claims along with Senator Reid’s comments are only symptomatic of it.

Instead of apologizing for this war, we the American people must stand up for its prosecution, and take the fight to politicians who insist upon ignoring its extent and scope.

The stakes in Iraq are necessarily tied to our overall prospects in defeating the state sponsors of terrorism. Removing one such sponsor, Hussein’s Iraq, from the region clearly will not and has not ended terrorism, but it is closer to where we need to be than what the opposition is arguing for, which quite literally takes the military option off the table as it relates to dealing with other terror states. We must redouble our efforts and reassert the original Bush Doctrine. Aiding Iraq to achieve reconciliation cannot be contingent upon the aid of Iraq’s reluctant neighbors, Syria and Iran, for such aid is most probably and unremarkably not forthcoming. Their actions instead indicate they are expanding their influence in the region, quite the opposite of what the ISG calls for, and recent moves by the Security Council seemingly ensure that in particular Iran will not be helpful. Indeed, we are not conditioning the current efforts to halt uranium enrichment at the UN on Iranian support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, nor should we. Instead, it appears likely that a day of reckoning is coming as it relates to Iraq’s relationship with its neighbors.

On that count, it is very clear that the peace cannot be had in Iraq without addressing the broader dangers which are faced in the Middle East. It must be clear that money and weapons coming across Iraq’s borders to fund the militias are not welcome, and Iraq must assert her authority to clearly state the stakes involved to her people and to her coalition partners. Developments throughout the Middle East (fighting for primacy in the Palestinian territories, Hezbollah’s increasing dominance in Lebanon, etc.) indicate that the militias are on the rise in the Middle East, and that the current fighting in Baghdad should be viewed in concert with the rising of new powers within the region. The question is hardly whether we should be involved or not, since we already are. The question is how best to enable the forces of civilization to prevail against the reactionary forces which we face.

Iraq is very much a proving ground, not only for whether freedom and democracy may prevail in the Middle East, but on whether the West has the will to succeed in the greater war on terrorism. The enemy is bringing the fight, and clearly success in Iraq is dependent upon foreign intervention, as it also is in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

As the President addresses an overall assessment of his doctrines, I would suggest an overall escalation across all fronts in the wider war. The question is not merely how to secure Iraq, it is how to achieve victory in this overall struggle. Theatres across the region must not be downplayed, and it is probably advantageous to keep the enemy guessing where we might move next, despite the ISG’s claims that diplomatic efforts with Iran or Syria are hampered by their belief that the U.S. favors regime change. Efforts need to be made across all of the fronts of the war in each of its theatres, and the American people must understand how these are related to one another. It is true that America’s long-term involvement in the war on terror will ultimately depend upon successes being achieved, but there are very clear goals which the President needs to state, much as President Reagan did in demanding an end to the Soviet empire in no unequivocal terms.

Efforts at accommodating our enemies in this region led to the attacks of 9/11 and beyond, and if the U.S. is not ready to confront our enemies now, over five years after the attacks, then we must consider if we have not been confrontational enough. If the American people, indeed, if U.S. leadership comes to the conclusion that the theatre in Iraq is hopeless, then it must conclude too that victory in the war on terrorism is hopeless. There is no way to avoid “Iraq Syndrome” for those who cannot see the stakes involved, since that lack of vision is exactly what Iraq Syndrome is.