Insurgency Reaches Boiling Point: Analysis

by Robert J. Romano

August 17th, 2004

The past many days in Iraq have seen a major increase in insurgent, terrorist violence in Iraq, with fighting taking place throughout the southern region of Iraq, which is predominantly a Shi'a region.  Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi militia has taken positions in Najaf, and have taken control of one of the most holy sites there, the Imam Ali Mosque.  While the fighting in Najaf has captured most of the media spotlight, and most analyses have focused on whether it is permissible to fire on holy sites, these short-sighted views fail to focus on a larger picture.  It appears that destroying or storming the mosque is precisely what the enemy is attempting to bait the Iraqi security forces, and the multinational forces (MNF), into doing for far more cynical, strategic reasons.   The recent fighting is in many ways a wake-up call for the Iraqi people and demonstrates that they have a vital stake in achieving a free and stable civil society, and that the Iraqi people must take a leading role in achieving this.  A unified federal, republican, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq, composed of Shi'a, Sunni, Kurds, and others is the antithesis of what the enemy wants to happen.  Their goal presently is to provoke a civil war between the various ethnic and religious elements of Iraqi society, and undermining this goal is essential towards achieving inevitably a tremendous victory in the war on terror.
        One of the prevailing opinions abound is that the neighboring powers want to split Iraq. The idea is that Iran wants to siphon off the Shi'a regions in the south, and Syria wants to siphon off the Sunni regions in the west. If true, then both of these powers have a strategic interest in a destabilized Iraq, and will run guns, bombs, and terrorists across porous borders in order to perpetuate the insurgency and provoke civil war.  Towards that end, it appears that al Sadr's militia is deliberately taking over holy sites with the hopes that the Iraqi security forces and American forces will overreact and destroy the sites. Iran has already called for international intervention to put a stop to the fighting that is presently taking place. They are now openly stating their interest in maintaining al Sadr's militia, and al Sadr himself. Why? So that the insurgency may continue, and so that the militia may survive to fight another day, but also to let insurgents know that they have friends. They are cornered, and whenver this happens all of a sudden they want to "negotiate."
        Fortunately, the forces have not taken the bait and simply destroyed the holy sites that the terrorists take refuge in. In my opinion, this would give the terrorists, and countries like Iran - who have an interest in a destabilized Iraq - a propaganda victory, which must be avoided. However, this is a huge problem if the terrorists believe they can avoid taking fire (and simultaneously direct fire from) holy sites. Damned if you do nothing, damned if you destroy their hideouts. It may be a similar propaganda victory the longer these militias survive and continue the "resistance." Typically, I would hope for the best of both worlds: eliminate the insurgents, terrorists, and foreign fighters without giving the enemy any sort of propaganda victory.

        It is completely necessary that as long as our forces are requested to remain in Iraq to aid in security, that we should remain. I don't like the negotiations necessarily (on the surface), but they appear to be completely necessary.  We need to be prepared for the possibility, indeed the probability, that such negotiations might fail. We need to hold our positions in Najaf around the holy site for the time being, for if (and when) negotiations fail, I suspect that the rest of militia will have to be eliminated.  However, it may be a better idea to leave them surrounded and let them rot.  If possible, I think al Sadr should be arrested in the end.
        What I find encouraging is that the Iraqi people are standing firm against private militias (see: "Iraqis Speak!" from August 16th, 2004, at Iraq the Model), and want to put an end to the violence. Their proposal is to offer a carrot for the rabbit. I think it's the wrong idea at first glance, and I don't believe that al Sadr should be allowed to acquire any political power as a result of directing this insurgency. The advocacy of violence is not protected speech, and the man is an advocate of violence. At this point, negotiations should probably be talking about unconditional surrender of the militia, not about acquiring political power. In a democracy, there is a right way, and a wrong way to gain the consent of the governed. Al Sadr's tactics of using the advocacy of violence, coercion, intimidation, and rebellion are repugnant to the values of a democracy. He's trying to lead a "resistance" but this too must be made to fail. The "revolution" to get rid of Hussein has already occurred, and the transition would be a lot smoother without al Sadr's perpetuation of the insurgency.  From Omar's piece: "He [Hussain al Sadr] called [on] Muqtada and his men to drop their weapons, leave the holy shrine and disband the Mehdi Army adding that guarantees can be provided by the government that there will be no consequences or penalties waiting for them after they evacuate the shrine."
        While not as unconditional a surrender I would call for, I suppose that if achieved this would be a remarkable accomplishment, and would certainly mark a token end to the insurgency in the south.  But would it be a substantive end, or an illusory one? What troubles me is that it appears that al Sadr is trying to blackmail his way to the decision-making table. However, if these terms are agreed to, there will be no excuse for noncompliance. Disbanding and disarming the militia is absolutely necessary, and if that can be accomplished peaceably, that would certainly be a worthy accomplishment. The end-goal must be in ending the insurgency one way or another.
         If al Sadr and the militia do not comply, it will only hurt their image in the eyes of the people. I like the idea of an Iraqi solution to the problem, and the surrender of the militia to the constraints of civil society. It should be becoming clear to the people of Najaf, for instance, that al Sadr is causing more trouble and problems than he is providing any meaningful solutions.
         It really appears that this is the man's last chance to get out of this mess. He would be wise to accept the terms without condition.  However, I suspect that his goal is the destruction of Imam Ali Mosque.
       The theocrats gain from the destruction of the mosque, because then they have their propaganda victory. They'll get to portray the war as being on Islam, which might help to enlist religious types into the terror cause.  Countries like Iran also gain from the destruction of the mosque, because then they can perpetuate and expand the insurgency. Iran just recently called for international intervention to halt the fighting in Najaf, which I believe reveals their interest in what happens there. They probably want the mosque destroyed, too. A destabilized Iraq serves their perceived interests because they must have the goal of expanding their own frontiers. However, the longer they perpetuate the insurgency, the more they're going to really tick us off, which is never in any country's interests.
       Other events around the country shed more light on the situation.  The Marines have disbanded the Fallujah brigade after a series of kidnappings and the murder of an Iraqi Lt. Col., which members of the brigade and city police are believed to have participated in, this according to UPI. In context to what is going on in the south, this seems to signal a new crackdown that will be taking place in Fallujah. If the brigade won't do it - indeed, if they've been infiltrated - then the MNF might step up the effort and drain the swamp there. While the coalition was taking back Fallujah earlier this year, it ended with a negotiated truce. With this new development, it seems that the gloves are being taken off.
        The decrease in car bombings seems to signal that the enemy is running low on terrorists at the moment. Hence, perhaps the need for the enemy to score a propaganda victory by having the mosque destroyed to help with recruitment.
        The heavy fighting in al Kut and in Amara seems to be a good reason why the terrorists would be running low in numbers. Everywhere the insurgents get into a fight, it's devastating for them. Putting it all together, this may be a last stand for the insurgents. 
        Iran makes the appeal for international intervention, publicly stating their interest in saving the insurgency from destruction. Perhaps fearful that a tremendous defeat for the insurgents would hurt any near-term recruitment effort, and watching the insurgents defeated in battle would certainly hurt that effort, and this might mean that their numbers are dwindling, and therefore they were desperate when they went public. There have also been recent reports where the terrorists are being recruited inside Iran to go into Iraq to fight the MNF. However, if fighting in Iraq turns out to be a fool's errand for the fighters, that hurts recruitment efforts.
        Now, as for al Zarqawi, his group(s) have been targeting Shi'a in Iraq (and anybody else that is working with the new government and the MNF), and according to more than one report, Iran is allowing him to operate along the Iran-Iraq border. So, his group punishes the Shi'a for working with the Americans, while al Sadr offers them a way out of the nightmare by joining the Mahdi militia.
        The near-term goal then has to be, as it has been, to turn the Iraqi people against the MNF and the new government as being more trouble than they are worth. However, if the demented and sick strategy is revealed to the Iraqi people, then it loses its potency, because then they can see that they are being used as pawns in a human grocery store.
        Overall, all these events appear to add up to the fact that the need for recruitment in order to perpetuate the insurgency is becoming paramount. Having a mosque or shrine (or three) destroyed would probably help that effort. Though, if the insurgents get blamed for it, it severely undermines their cause, in my opinion.  However, it may not matter who destroys the holy sites, so long as it inflames the passions of religious fundamentalist types who believe they are fighting for Islam.

        I found an excellent analysis at Radio Free Europe here.  What appears to be significant about Basrah, at the moment, is that there have been demonstrations in support of the al Sadr insurgency. Also, leaders there have threatened to lock up the oil there from being exported. And also, the most disturbing thing: "This week, leaders in the Al-Basrah, Maysan, and Dhi Qar governorates announced their desire to secede from Baghdad and establish a federal state in southern Iraq if Iraqi and multinational forces refused to withdraw from Al-Najaf."
        We must not underestimate the enemy in our analyses.  They are diabolical. In contrast with the April fighting, the insurgents in the south appear to have reorganized into a more unified front, to the point where they are even openly declaring their intentions to spark a civil war through secession. The insurgents are gathering support amongst southern local governments, who also don't want to see the militias destroyed. The insurgents would have to be intimately aware of that, and the talk of secession, and know that they might be able to martyr a civil war if they hold their positions. The southern governments, like many others, want PM Allawi to negotiate with the insurgents for a peaceful solution.
        However, I suspect that these insurgents may need a peaceful resolution because they are cornered. It may be possible that the mosque in Najaf is only of secondary importance, however, it really appears that for most of the Shi'a world, it is a flashpoint to be used as a pretext for civil war inside Iraq. This can be linked to Iran's call for international intervention, if we are to assume that if the south secedes that Iran would declare her to be a protectorate (or worse, would simply use covert means to back a new government there and therefore maintain plausible deniability).
        The whole idea here has to be the destabilization, and fragmentation of Iraq, which I believe countries such as Islamist Iran and Baathist Syria want to usurp to expand their own frontiers, since the Hussein regime has been deposed. The idea is to crush any unity in the Islamic world between Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurds working toward a democratic future.
        Looking at the map, you may be led to believe that the "main event" is to be in Basrah, which may even be inevitable. Most of the oil is there in the south. Those who are pro-insurgency will want to perpetuate the fighting, provoke a civil war, and give the oil over to Iran essentially. Al Sadr has to know about the plans for secession "if foreign forces are not removed from Najaf" and therefore a negotiated settlement is not in his interests, unless he believes that by doing so he consolidates more power and gets to fight another day. His militia may in all probability hold its ground and break the ceasefire again in order to provoke the civil war, though, because a negotiated settlement may in fact be nothing short of unconditional surrender.
        It appears that what is taking place is the linking together of various fuses. Najaf appears to be the fuse to be lit, and Basrah (indeed, the whole south) is the powderkeg to be exploded.  However, based on the caution being exercised by PM Allawi, the Iraqi security forces, and the MNF, they obviously understand the danger and are taking the correct actions.  
        As of this writing, it appears that fighting has sparked yet again in Najaf.  It appears that the insurgents are going to make their last stand and try to be martyrs. However, since it's obviously the insurgents who keep breaking the truces, the tenability of a secession is going to be severely undermined. My prescription is to call the insurgents' bluff and crush them throughout Iraq, and simultaneously conduct negotiations with al Sadr (i.e. unconditional surrender). When the dust clears, he would be one of the only militants left. By destroying the insurgency throughout Iraq, he loses his bargaining power.  Hopefully, the insurgency will be eliminated, and foreign powers that are meddling in Iraq's internal affairs will be put on notice.  Freedom and democracy will not fail in Iraq, and our dedication and commitment to the nations we liberate will always be rock-solid.  We will not abandon our allies, and the actions of the enemy shall be made to fail.  Do not be sucked into debates about whether to destroy a mosque or not, for the issues surrounding the situation are far more complex than a simple question of the justice of one particular action, such as the permissibility of taking out the mosque.  We must consider that this is precisely what the enemy wants us to do.  

        [Update (8/18/04): Apparently, the standoff is coming to an end.  Al Sadr has "agreed Wednesday to leave a holy shrine encircled by U.S. marines, hours after the interim government threatened to storm it and drive out his fighters... Raising hopes for a peaceful resolution to the standoff, Iraqi delegates to a conference to choose a national assembly said firebrand cleric Moqtada al-Sadr had agreed to accept their demands to resolve the crisis." So, the interim government offered an ultimatum of preemptive action, and have achieved an unconditional surrender.  No negotiations.  Now, the militia must comply, disarm, disband, and renounce violence.  There are words, and there are actions, and the militia must take the correct actions and rejoin civil society.  They must exit the state of nature... Update II: So much for an unconditional surrender! Al Sadr is already making demands... "Iraqi Shiite Muslim cleric Moqtada al- Sadr demanded a cease-fire before he disarms his supporters in the holy city of Najaf, Sky News said, citing unidentified reports." He's trying to make it look like it's the Iraqis that are surrendering to his own position.  In other words, he wants the settlement to be conditioned on his own demands so that he saves face... Update III: The militia is making even more demands now: "'Sayyed Moqtada and his fighters are ready to throw down their weapons and leave for the sake of Iraq,' Ali al-Yassiri, Sadr's political liaison officer, told Reuters.  'But they should stop attacking him first and pull away from the shrine.'" Update IV: Iraq's Defense Ministry has answered back that amnesty will be offered, but only after the insurgency ends: "Iraq's Defense Ministry Wednesday ordered Shi'ite militiamen in Najaf to immediately lay down their weapons and leave the shrine... The ministry said in a statement radical cleric Sadr and his followers would be granted amnesty only after they abandon an armed uprising in Najaf and at least seven other cities... The statement made no mention of an earlier demand by Sadr that U.S. Marines agree a truce before he would disarm his militia and leave the shrine." ... Update V: As the tense standoff continues, so does sporadic fighting.  Al Sadr's next response should truly be unconditional surrender, however I suspect his militia will simply repeat their demands for a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces away from the Imam Ali Mosque.  The Defense Ministry has done really well for the Iraqi people in not flinching, and has not wavered in their insistence that they leave the mosque and surrender.  Al Sadr is trying to save face by attempting to end the standoff (for now) with a (undoubtedly temporary) ceasefire, but the Iraqi government is not biting. That militia needs to surrender now. Their choice is clear: destruction, or surrender. Let us all hope and pray that they will make the rational choice.]

        [Update VI: This is a farce. Al Sadr's putting out all this press today, but his forces are not moving an inch.  Perhaps the idea is to make it look like al Sadr surrendered, and then the "evil" government storms the mosque (because in reality he was not complying) and then the propagandists try to make it look like it was the government that broke the "truce" (which the government never accepted to begin with because there were no negotiations really).  More or less, al Sadr is playing a game and has to be intimately aware of how the propaganda works.  Despite all the media coverage today of the overtures made by al Sadr, he still hasn't complied with the original terms of the surrender.  There's what he says, and what he does. He's not complying right now. So, we're really back to square one in terms of the mosque - there's just a lot less insurgents now.  In any event, it's not over yet. If al Sadr "surrendered", then why hasn't his militia left Najaf yet? Why is there still fighting going on? Things don't look good right now... for al Sadr... Update VII (8/19/04): It appears that al Sadr has been given his final chance to put an end to the insurgency peaceably by Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi: "'This is the final call for them to disarm, vacate the holy shrine, engage in political work and consider the interests of the homeland,' interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi told a Baghdad news conference." Despite the risks involved in storming the mosque, if al Sadr refuses to end the insurgency, the costs of inaction appear to be greater than the costs of action.  This must come to an end, one way or the other.  What is clear is that a choice must be made by al Sadr to end the insurgency, either peacefully, or through defeat.]

        [Update VIII (8/20/04): The Grand Ayatollah al Sistani has made a similar call for the insurgency to end, according to Iraq the Model (see: Breaking News, August 20th, 2004):  "The reporter of Radio Sawa said: Al-Sistani called the militias to leave Najaf immediately and hand over the city to the Iraqi government describing the presence of militias as illegitimate and that the presence these militias inside the shrine is desecrating its holiness.  Sistani had also stressed on the necessity to hold the elections according to the declared schedule saying that the results of the elections will decide who has the right to lead Iraq.  Sistani added 'the coalition forces came and helped Iraqis to get rid of a brutal tyrant that murdered Iraqis and destroyed Iraq’s economy and they didn’t come to kill Muslims or attack Islam...'" This is indeed good news, and hopefully helps the standoff to come to a peaceful conclusion with the surrender of the militia, its disarmament, and disbandment.  There are various reports that the Iraqi police had arrested hundreds of the militia and had taken control of the Imam Ali Mosque, but these have since been discredited.  This report appears to be most promising in the way of finding a peaceful solution: "Militiamen loyal to rebel Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr on Friday removed their weapons from the revered Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf as part of an arrangement aimed at ending a 2-week-old anti-U.S. uprising centered on the holy site... Iraq’s highest Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, agreed to take control of the shrine, which al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia turned into a stronghold and refuge during their fight with U.S. forces... Al-Sadr aides were working out a handover of the keys to the site with al-Sistani followers. One aide said the keys could be given later Friday... 'We are not going to attack the mosque, we are not going to attack Muqtada al-Sadr and the mosque, evidently we are not going to do this,' Allawi told BBC radio Friday. 'The olive branch is still extended, he can take advantage of the olive branch.' ... Al-Sadr has so far rejected the other main government demand — that he disband his Mahdi Army. But surrendering the shrine would likely mean the end of the fighting that erupted on Aug. 5. U.S. forces had ruled out an American assault on the site and had faced tough fighting in a vast cemetery nearby from which al-Sadr fighters fired on American and Iraqi troops." Apparently, the situation may in all actuality end peaceably, but it is still incumbent on the Mahdi militia to disarm and disband in order for it to come into compliance.  According to other reports, though, the militia is still in control of the mosque, has not at all laid down its arms, and it remains to be seen if they will heed the calls by both Prime Minister Allawi and al Sistani to surrender.  "'The shrine is in the control of the Mehdi Army,' said Sheikh Ahmad al-Sheibani, a top militia commander. 'The Mehdi Army will resist any attempt by the Iraqi police to control the shrine... Procedures are under way to hand over control of the shrine to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,' he added, referring to Iraq's most influential Shi'ite cleric." There appears to be a lot of conflicting information out there today, and it is hardly clear that there has been any definite resolution... Update IX: It appears that reports of the weapons being removed from the mosque are being confirmed, a positive sign.  However, it is still incumbent on the militia to disarm completely, disband the militia for good, and end the insurgency all together.  They need to come into compliance with the terms being set out by the interim Iraqi government.]

        [Update X: It looks like the Iraqi government, Iraqi forces, and MNF have averted a major disaster and have handed a tremendous defeat to al Sadr's insurgency. While on the surface, an amnesty seems like an awful idea because then the militia could survive to fight another day, it seems that the militia's stalling has proven to be devastating for them. While the people inside the mosque have been for the most part spared from attack, elsewhere in Iraq they have had the battle brought to them, such as in Sadr City, and have suffered defeat wherever they meet the military.  In other words, the amnesty, the longer al Sadr waits to accept it, will apply to less and less fighters and terrorists.  Also of interest is that the plans for secession in the south appear to have been averted and overcome (for the moment), as the threats made by local governates in the south (Basrah, Maysan, and Dhi Qar) appear to have been empty. It appears that al Sadr needed the pretext of having the mosque attacked, or at least he was supposed to have announced the secession due to the battle. (Perhaps aid that he was counting on never came through, plus the militia has been largely devastated...) Those governates were justifying their desire to secede and conditioning it on whether the forces would pull back from Najaf.  However, the forces remain in place. So where's the secession? By taking the fight to the insurgency throughout Iraq and simultaneously remaining firm to al Sadr for unconditional surrender, the Iraqi government has committed a master stroke in what appears to be a tremendous defeat for the insurgency.  The next (and perhaps final) step appears to be finishing it off and achieving the unconditional surrender and disbandment of the militia... Update XI: It appears that my thought that Iran has a vested interest in what takes place in particular in Najaf was well-founded: "In Tehran, Iranians staged street protests Friday over the violence in Najaf, the third holiest city to Shiite Muslims after Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, and condemned 'the slaughter of the Iraqi people and the desecration of holy sites and cities of the country by the U.S. military in Iraq.' ... The demonstrators also described Iraq's interim government as 'illegitimate' and a 'puppet' of the United States, IRNA reported, and urged Muslim countries to dispatch a military force to defend Najaf's holy sites." The rest of the article also cites numerous Iranian, and also Syrian officials stating their interest.  What is of note is that while the demonstrators in Tehran blame the U.S. military for desecrating the Imam Ali Mosque, the Grand Ayatollah al Sistani has placed the blame squarely on al Sadr and his militia.]

        [Update XII (8/23/04): Here's some background on some of the elements in play.  I've identified at least four significant entities involved: 1) al Sadr; 2) the Mahdi militia; 3) Iran; 4) Hezbollah.  The relationship between each is important enough to first get into.  Al Sadr appears to be the figurehead in charge of the militia, who appear to be largely disaffected youths who want to wage battle for a variety of reasons.  The militia are pawns, and expendable to al Sadr's own goals.  They are also renewable, meaning when they take hits they need to reorganize and find new fighters.  In a country of 25 million with about 15 million Shi'a, there is a tremendous base to draw upon, even if we're only talking about a very tiny minority.  He only needs hundreds and thousands to be a significant thorn in the side of the move towards democracy.  Using coordination from Iran and Hezbollah, al Sadr and his militia have a support network.  "Military sources said Sheik al-Sadr is being aided directly by Iran's Revolutionary Guard, which plays a large role in running that country, and by Hezbollah, an Iranian-created terrorist group based in Lebanon." To me, that means there are Iranian agents inside of Najaf (and the rest of the south) probably right now, but any that have direct ties to Iran's Revolutionary Guard may be backing off now that the light is shining on the connection which they probably do not want to be implicated in.  The connection appears to be unraveling, and I would guess that the militia is being hung out to dry, since they are expendable pawns.  From the same article:  "Sheik al-Sadr, who has traveled to Iran and met with its hard-line Shi'ite clerics, is an ardent foe of the United States who wants all foreign troops to leave... The United States suspects that his goal is to create a hard-line Shi'ite regime in Iraq modeled after Tehran's government." This jives with recent reports of a planned secession of the south.  However, since it's been exposed, its tenability and element of surprise is ruined.  Any secession is necessarily tied to Iran.  If al Sadr tries to secede, then Iran gets blamed.  Since al Sadr has traveled to Iran to meet with the clerics there, it should be assumed that either he let them know what he was going to do with the insurgency or that they actively planned it together, but the relationship had to be contingent on its success.  Since al Sadr has been unsuccessful, that could explain why the secession has yet to go forward.  Time is running out.  If elections go off in January, and the broad majority of Iraqis (especially the Shi'a in the south) participate, then the complete failure of the insurgency will be revealed.  I've been asking: what would al Sadr replace the interim government and constitution with? What political process is he offering as an alternative? The secession of the south appears to be what the plan was.  The next question is: why hasn't it gone forward? If it's because the insurgency has been a failure to get majority support in the south, then that simply means that such a secession, like the insurgency, would fail as well.  If true, then the only way it could work is with the aid of foreign powers.  Al Sadr, if he is waiting for foreign aid, is doomed.  Such overt appeals hurt al Sadr's interests, because they implicate his backers.  Since they've been implicated for months, I believe it is possible they were basing their support on the success that the insurgency would have.  Since they've been unsuccessful, since they couldn't even get the MNF to storm the mosque in Najaf, they are losing their pretext for secession.  They can't even get Shi'a clerics in Iraq to help them.  The militia may yet declare secession out of desperation, but with their numbers dwindling, their window of opportunity has in all probability already passed, unless they can secure assurances from foreign powers to support the secession with troops, or some other form of international intervention.  Of course, since the transition to freedom and democracy in Iraq is already authorized under the law of nations, legitimate international intervention is ruled out unless Iran can persuade UN Security Council members that the south is being unlawfully occupied.  The only other option for Iran is invasion, either overt or covert, if they wish to secure a secessionist state in the south, and in extension the oil.  Given the present circumstances, and the failure of the insurgency, such support will probably remain covert, unless Iran perceives that the only way to ensure success is overt escalation.]

        [Update XIII: Another great analysis, this time from National Review's W. Thomas Smith, Jr.  Some good cause for optimism, and seems to back up my thought that the enemy is running low on forces: "'It appears to me that in April and May we killed the best and brightest [of the Mahdi army],' 1st Lt. Brian Suits of the Army's 1st Cavalry Division in Najaf, said during a radio interview with talk-radio host Kirby Wilbur on Seattle's KVI radio, last Thursday. 'What al Sadr is doing now is sending in the guys who are left behind to make a statement. He's running out of guys. The guys he has are frankly running out of motivation. There are ill-prepared and ill-trained. They are beginning to question their authority. I think they're saying 'wait a minute, you told us that God was going to guide our bullets, but we haven't killed one American soldier in our area and we are dying left and right here.'"]