Adapting the Concept of Imminent Threat

by Robert J. Romano

February 6th, 2004

Updated April 3rd, 2004

Updated July 20th, 2004

In formulating an understanding of The National Security Strategy of the United States, it will be important to come to grips with a few basic concepts, as articulated by the President's document of September, 2002.  "We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries." (15) This is an important rationale to understanding the nature of what is being proposed, for it calls for changing  the justification of preemption from that of imminent threat to that of emerging threat.  "Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat - most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack." (15) In today's post-9/11 world, a threat need not be imminent in order for it to be immediate, or present.  The classic concept is an unnecessary restriction which does not apply to covert actions, such as those taken by terrorists, which are unconventional and are not visible until it is too late.  The concept of immediacy applies in this case not to the visible preparation  of armies or navies for invasion, as in the classic imminent threat concept, but rather to the present development of WMD capabilities, which when coupled with a state's ability and intent to finance terrorism in one's own region, is inconsistent with the norms of international of peace and security.  In adapting the concept of imminent threat, a debate needs to be had with the sufficiency of waiting for a threat to become imminent before action is justifiable.  In addressing present dangers to the peace, sharing a border with the enemy is not a prerequisite for military action.  Even when threats have not been imminent, the U.S. has in the past taken action, justifiably so, in order to preempt threats and to prevent their further emergence.  If an imminent threat, in the classic sense, applies to the inevitability of invasion - which it does - then the concept of imminence is not adequate to describe an emerging danger such as a terrorist-sponsoring state which pursues WMD capability, which if allowed to grow and progress, grows in its costs and drawbacks.  Instead of utilizing conventional tactics, such as invasion, our enemies today know that such attacks would fail.  The rationale for terrorism arrives in the hopelessness of conventional tactics.  The danger posed by terrorist-sponsoring states who pursue WMD technology grows with time if the threat is not addressed before it becomes imminent.  Since terrorists use surprise tactics, it would be insufficient and undesirable to wait for a threat to become imminent as a prerequisite to taking action.

        In addressing the justification for preemption, in the post-9/11 setting, as it applies to the National Security of the United States, or to international peace and security, it will be important for future leaders to consider not waiting for an imminent threat before action becomes necessary and proper.  Even if the time and place of the enemy's action is unknown, it is insufficient to assume that we are obligated by virtue of antiquarian rationale to only act if restrictive conditions are met, such as being attacked first and thus only responding to attacks.  Wars are not won by waiting for the enemy to inflict harm, they are won by preventing the enemy from ever getting that close.  All wars and military actions, whether anybody would care to admit, are preventive in that they are offensive, and in the immediate sense of attacking present dangers, they are preemptive, and in the sense that we've lost soldiers and civilians, they are defensive.  The causes for military action need not be so restrictive as it applies to terrorist-sponsoring states who pursue WMD capabilities.

        Since the concept of imminent threat has never applied to the development of WMD capabilities and sponsorship of terrorism before, it is insufficient to describe the danger as such.  These are gathering dangers.  "Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.  The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action." (15) Even the pursuit of WMD by a terrorist-sponsoring state is now considered a sufficient threat to the peace and security not just of the United States, but also the international community.   To those nations, or peoples who are subject to the rule imposed by terrorist-sponsoring states, we ought to offer freedom.  The adaptation of the imminent threat concept is called for since it is no longer sufficient for the use of force to be applied solely against preempting aggression in the traditional sense.  Yes, it is justified to preempt the imminent threat of invasion, but it is also justified to preempt the gathering and immediate threat of state-sponsorship of terrorism.  That there are states who sponsor terrorism is undeniable.  States who have in the past sponsored terrorism must be vigilant in pursuing and preventing hostile acts.  It is within the norms of international cooperation for states to work together to prevent terrorism, which leaves states that have sponsored terrorism with a choice: they are with us, or they are against us.

        The case for regime change speaks in noncompliance and non-cooperation by states whom refuse to pursue and prevent terror, and the case is made even more compelling by similar states whom seek to acquire even the capabilities of WMD.  If the possession of WMD is banned for particular states who have in the past been aggressors, the destruction of WMD capabilities is a necessary procedure to ensuring compliance to the international obligations that are attached to having been an aggressor.  Regime change is necessary when those obligations are not fully met.  Belligerence will not deter the coalition from acting against states whom will not comply with agreements which call for the dismantlement of terror networks and the disarmament even of WMD capabilities.  The objective of terror, when coupled with the possession of even the capability of producing WMD, as in the form of program-related activities, scientists, and knowledge, constitutes a sufficient threat to the peace and security of all.  If free peoples are the targets of such acts of terrorism, then it is free states which must act against the forces of terror.  If a state harbors terrorist training camps, and is at the same time pursuing WMD, the risk of inaction, as phrased in Strategy, becomes greater.  Given the impossibility or at least the impracticability of predicting when and where terrorist attacks will take place, a more forward strategy is called for.

        Freedom and democracy, as institutions which are right and just, are the most significant advantages we as a free people possess.  When regime change is called for, it is inconsiderate to human nature to assume that a society is incapable of achieving free institutions on their own.  Firstly, we are all entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and our natural rights are inviolable.  Secondly, it is uncompassionate, and isolationistic, to not help build states which respect human dignity, and pursue national reform.  The strategy of spreading freedom, and offering incentives to states whom pursue national reform in the form of grants, is consistent with the values and compassion, as well as the national interests, of the United States.  In discussing Strategy, it will be important for students, readers, and citizens alike to become familiar with the concepts which apply to the safety and security of all.  We are all in this together.

        It is insufficient, unwise, and morally reprehensible to sit by idly while states whom harbor terror and pursue the capabilities to develop WMD are given free reign.  The international community must articulate preemption as the necessary means to defeating terrorism, and the tyrants who support terrorism.  The condition of acting preemptively must be considered on whether or not the danger is present, not whether or not it is imminent.  Presence of danger should be the proper measure for determining if action is justifiable.  It is up to nation-states to come to consensus about what constitutes a present danger, and they must reach the same conclusion that Strategy does, for, if they do not, they will not be addressing the threats that presently exist.